Permanent U.S. military bases: Why Bush is willing to sacrifice our children
TPM Cafe's Book Club has featured Larry Diamond, author of squandered victory, who from January to April 2004 served as Senior Adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. The polls are showing that a majority of Americans are unhappy about Bush's war and a BIG majority are unhappy with Bush.
Diamond's discussion of the importance of the issue of permanent U.S. military bases to the people of the Middle East is essential to understanding the insurgency and its widespread support. Tennie Mark has said all along that Bush started the war with Iraq because he wanted to establish permanent military bases in the Middle East . And I've written several posts about that on this blog.
Diamond provides the most cogent explanation of how this intention to build permanent bases has fueled the insurgency and asks why Bush isn't being pressed on this by Congress and the so-called "liberal" media (that refuses to press Bush on any of his pretenses and deceptions).
I've pasted a section of Larry Diamond's post below--but I encourage you to read the entire forum on Diamond's book.
Aug 09, 200
Larry Diamond
.....
One of the issues that most baffles me in a way is the question of long-term military bases in Iraq. It's now pretty clear that the ambition to establish long-term American military bases in Iraq, in order to secure the Persian Gulf region, contain Iranian expansion, and enable us to draw down or withdraw altogether our forces in Saudi Arabia, was an important motivation for going to war. When we pressed so vigorously and relentlessly in the drafting of the interim constitution for the easiest possible means of ratifying a treaty, it became clear to me that we were looking to smooth the way for an eventual treaty with Iraq giving us long-term basing rights.
At the same time, we know from a variety of sources, private as well as public, that intense opposition to US plans to establish long-term military bases in Iraq is one of the most passionate motivations behind the insurgency. There are many different strands to the violent resistance that plagues Iraq: Islamist and secular, Sunni and Shiite, Baathist and non-Baathist, Iraqi and foreign. The one thing that unites these disparate elements is Iraqi (or broader pan-Arab) nationalism-resistance to what they see as a long-term project for imperial domination by the United States. Neutralizing this anti-imperial passion-by clearly stating that we do not intend to remain in Iraq indefinitely-is essential to winding down the insurgency.
There are four key elements to a political strategy for diminishing the violent resistance in Iraq. First, the Bush Administration must declare that the U.S. will not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. Second, we should declare some sort of time frame (but not a rigid deadline) by which we think we can withdraw militarily-if Iraqi groups that are supporting or tolerating the violence will instead help build the new political order. Third, we need to talk directly to the (largely Sunni) political groups connected to the insurgency, some of which have been seeking to talk to the U.S. for almost two years. Fourth, we need an honest broker to help mediate these discussions and build confidence in the process; this might be a small international contact group including representatives from the United Nations and one or two of the European embassies in Baghdad.
The Bush Administration is refusing to take any of these four steps. It won't renounce the bases because it wants them. It won't consider any kind of timetable, even without fixed deadlines, even dependent on the cooperation of the other side, because it doesn't want to look weak, and it doesn't really know when Iraqi forces will be ready to assume the burdens of maintaining order (against an insurgency that is fueled in part by the lack of an Administration strategy). It has refused to talk to the insurgent groups because, again, it fears this being misinterpreted as a sign of weakness, and because, once you have said about the insurgency, "Bring them on," they are just "evildoers," what is left to discuss? They have taken steps to bring the marginalized Sunnis into the political process. The Sunnis have a place on the constitution drafting committee in large measure because of American pressure. I do give the Administration credit for that. But this is only the beginning of a political strategy.
The Bush Administration confronts a dilemma that it cannot resolve. We are bleeding in Iraq because of it. On the one hand, it clings to the geopolitical ambition-the dangerous illusion-that Iraqis will abide the establishment of long-term American military bases in Iraq, transforming their country into American ally from whose soil we could project military power throughout the region. Iraqis will not accept this by democratic means-not by a two-thirds vote of their parliament, not even by the more minimal simple majority that we were insisting on. Therefore, we would give up nothing of real value by declaring that we will not seek long-term military bases, but we would gain something enormously significant: the ability to erode the insurgency through political means.
What concerns me as much as anything is the listless state of our own democracy. Why have the Congress and the news media not effectively challenged the Administration on this issue? Why has the White House press corps not asked President Bush the obvious and urgent question, "Mr. President, do we seek long-term military bases in Iraq? If so, do you believe this strategic goal is worth the loss of more American lives in Iraq? If not, why don't you declare that we will not do so, so as to remove one of the most powerful political mobilizing grounds for the insurgency?" Why have the Congress and the media not challenged Secretary Rumsfeld: "Mr. Secretary, are we building permanent military bases in Iraq? What are our intentions there?"
Further Reading:
Larry Diamond's biography as a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution
"What Went Wrong in Iraq" by Larry Diamond.
--
Diamond's discussion of the importance of the issue of permanent U.S. military bases to the people of the Middle East is essential to understanding the insurgency and its widespread support. Tennie Mark has said all along that Bush started the war with Iraq because he wanted to establish permanent military bases in the Middle East . And I've written several posts about that on this blog.
Diamond provides the most cogent explanation of how this intention to build permanent bases has fueled the insurgency and asks why Bush isn't being pressed on this by Congress and the so-called "liberal" media (that refuses to press Bush on any of his pretenses and deceptions).
I've pasted a section of Larry Diamond's post below--but I encourage you to read the entire forum on Diamond's book.
Aug 09, 200
Larry Diamond
.....
One of the issues that most baffles me in a way is the question of long-term military bases in Iraq. It's now pretty clear that the ambition to establish long-term American military bases in Iraq, in order to secure the Persian Gulf region, contain Iranian expansion, and enable us to draw down or withdraw altogether our forces in Saudi Arabia, was an important motivation for going to war. When we pressed so vigorously and relentlessly in the drafting of the interim constitution for the easiest possible means of ratifying a treaty, it became clear to me that we were looking to smooth the way for an eventual treaty with Iraq giving us long-term basing rights.
At the same time, we know from a variety of sources, private as well as public, that intense opposition to US plans to establish long-term military bases in Iraq is one of the most passionate motivations behind the insurgency. There are many different strands to the violent resistance that plagues Iraq: Islamist and secular, Sunni and Shiite, Baathist and non-Baathist, Iraqi and foreign. The one thing that unites these disparate elements is Iraqi (or broader pan-Arab) nationalism-resistance to what they see as a long-term project for imperial domination by the United States. Neutralizing this anti-imperial passion-by clearly stating that we do not intend to remain in Iraq indefinitely-is essential to winding down the insurgency.
There are four key elements to a political strategy for diminishing the violent resistance in Iraq. First, the Bush Administration must declare that the U.S. will not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. Second, we should declare some sort of time frame (but not a rigid deadline) by which we think we can withdraw militarily-if Iraqi groups that are supporting or tolerating the violence will instead help build the new political order. Third, we need to talk directly to the (largely Sunni) political groups connected to the insurgency, some of which have been seeking to talk to the U.S. for almost two years. Fourth, we need an honest broker to help mediate these discussions and build confidence in the process; this might be a small international contact group including representatives from the United Nations and one or two of the European embassies in Baghdad.
The Bush Administration is refusing to take any of these four steps. It won't renounce the bases because it wants them. It won't consider any kind of timetable, even without fixed deadlines, even dependent on the cooperation of the other side, because it doesn't want to look weak, and it doesn't really know when Iraqi forces will be ready to assume the burdens of maintaining order (against an insurgency that is fueled in part by the lack of an Administration strategy). It has refused to talk to the insurgent groups because, again, it fears this being misinterpreted as a sign of weakness, and because, once you have said about the insurgency, "Bring them on," they are just "evildoers," what is left to discuss? They have taken steps to bring the marginalized Sunnis into the political process. The Sunnis have a place on the constitution drafting committee in large measure because of American pressure. I do give the Administration credit for that. But this is only the beginning of a political strategy.
The Bush Administration confronts a dilemma that it cannot resolve. We are bleeding in Iraq because of it. On the one hand, it clings to the geopolitical ambition-the dangerous illusion-that Iraqis will abide the establishment of long-term American military bases in Iraq, transforming their country into American ally from whose soil we could project military power throughout the region. Iraqis will not accept this by democratic means-not by a two-thirds vote of their parliament, not even by the more minimal simple majority that we were insisting on. Therefore, we would give up nothing of real value by declaring that we will not seek long-term military bases, but we would gain something enormously significant: the ability to erode the insurgency through political means.
What concerns me as much as anything is the listless state of our own democracy. Why have the Congress and the news media not effectively challenged the Administration on this issue? Why has the White House press corps not asked President Bush the obvious and urgent question, "Mr. President, do we seek long-term military bases in Iraq? If so, do you believe this strategic goal is worth the loss of more American lives in Iraq? If not, why don't you declare that we will not do so, so as to remove one of the most powerful political mobilizing grounds for the insurgency?" Why have the Congress and the media not challenged Secretary Rumsfeld: "Mr. Secretary, are we building permanent military bases in Iraq? What are our intentions there?"
Further Reading:
Larry Diamond's biography as a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution
"What Went Wrong in Iraq" by Larry Diamond.
--
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